When monitoring or enforcement is difficult, governments may find it impossible to manage village forest commons directly. Village-level institutions might be better able to manage these commons, yet villagers' management objectives may not coincide with those of the state. This paper considers the effects of two different government policies on the local management of village commons. One policy tool attempts to induce villagers to conserve forest commons by giving them a share of the timber harvest. We investigate the question of whether or not this scheme (JFM) is preferred either by the villagers or the government to a simple benchmark policy, under which the government harvests at random. We show that, when villagers are sufficiently patient, for any equilibrium JFM policy there exists a benchmark policy which gives villagers the same level of utility. However, whether the government is similarly indifferent between these two arrangements depends on the villagers' ability to enforce collective agreements regarding forest use, and on the curvature of villagers' utility functions. 
Introduction
One of the major causes of deforestation in developing countries is the nature of property rights over forests and their produce. Even where nominally owned by the state, a forest near a village tends to serve as a de facto commons for villagers. Often villagers rely on forest commons chiefly for fuelwood. Because the costs of acquiring fuelwood increase as the stock of the resource decreases, individual gatherers of fuelwood do not bear the full costs of their activity. The existence of this negative externality implies that the equilibrium outcome will differ from the Pareto optimal outcome, a textbook reason for advocating government intervention in markets.
What is interesting in this case is that there are reasons to expect that textbook remedies to the problem of negative externalities are unlikely to be of much use. Levying a Pigovian tax is impractical, because of the difficulty of monitoring fuelwood collection over vast areas by many people. Applying a Coasian solution of assigning property rights over the forest is impractical for a similar reason; it may be difficult to identify those who trespass against these rights.
The difficulties described above in implementing a Pigovian or Coasian scheme to eliminate the externality do not rest entirely on conjecture. Indeed, the forest departments of the various states of India have for years attempted to regulate private exploitation of state forests. Forest guards monitor the resource, and a complicated system of fines tied to the market price of fuelwood implements something resembling a Pigovian tax. The chief problem with this scheme is hinted at above; the forest guards are woefully inadequate in number and omniscience, so that the private returns to illicitly collecting fuelwood continue to greatly exceed the private costs.
Because of the difficulty of direct management of village forest commons, governments may instead attempt to encourage good local management practices. Arnold [2] describes eight different programs in six different countries (India, Korea, Nepal, Mexico, the Philippines, and Thailand) designed by a central government to encourage good local management of forest commons. For concreteness, we examine one particular attempt, an incentive based scheme in India called Joint Forest Management (JFM). 1 JFM (and related schemes) depend upon the fact that villagers have more reliable information about extractive behavior than forest guards are likely to have. Under JFM, the state essentially turns management of the forest commons over to the village for some fixed period of time, after which the forest commons are logged and the village receives a share of the revenue from timber. This share is meant to provide incentives for the village to reduce overharvesting, and also to induce the villagers to invest in the sorts of institutional arrangements which would help to regulate the use of the commons [17] .
In this paper, we address the question of whether or not JFM can improve upon a particular benchmark policy, under which the government undertakes timber operations in the village commons at random intervals. This a very simple class of policies, requiring no information or planning to implement, and thus doing better than the benchmark policy seems like a minimal requirement for JFM to satisfy. Nonetheless, in general the superiority of one scheme over the other will depend on the local environment, particularly on the forest stock and villagers' enforcement abilities. It may be best to implement JFM in some places, and not in others. In fact, some countries have implemented schemes which resemble the benchmark policy we describe; in the Philippines, for example, the government has in some places simply transferred public forest lands to local communities, but with the explicit proviso that the state may reclaim those lands and their timber wealth at any point in the future.
We model the problem of managing a commons as a problem of resource allocation in the face of difficulties in monitoring and enforcement. Imperfect enforcement may limit the extent of cooperation observed within the village. We begin the paper by developing a model of common property forest management at the level of the village. Relative to much of the earlier literature on forest policy, there are three main innovations here. First, while most of the literature (though see [4] ) has analyzed two period problems, our model and results extend to the case of an infinite
horizon. Second, we analyze Markov perfect equilibria in the village, allowing households to behave strategically. Third, cooperation may break down because of problems with enforcement; our model permits us to consider a continuum of possible outcomes as the villagers' enforcement technology varies.
After an analysis of outcomes in the absence of any government policy, we follow [5] in asking how different government policies might affect village management of the commons. We show that for any equilibrium allocation under a JFM contract, there exists an equilibrium allocation under the benchmark policy which makes the villagers at least as well off. The relative value of a given JFM contract vis-à-vis the benchmark turns out to depend in an interesting way on the enforcement technology available to the village.
We then turn to the problem facing the state, which must choose not only a policy regime (JFM or benchmark), but must also choose policy parameters which maximize timber revenues while taking into account village behavior. 2 When the village enforcement technology is taken as given by the state and the village, we show in a computed example that the state prefers the benchmark policy over JFM for all levels of the forest stock and enforcement technology. By replacing an uncertain harvest date with a certain one, JFM induces villagers to run down the forest stock in advance of the harvest date. However, if the villagers' elasticity of marginal utility is greater than one, then JFM is preferred to the benchmark.
Finally, we consider the possibility that JFM may provide villagers with an incentive to invest in a better enforcement technology. Instead of taking the enforcement technology as given, we take as given the costs of improved enforcement. By comparing the marginal benefits to enforcement under both the benchmark strategy as well as under JFM, we are able to see which policy is likely to lead to greater investments in the institutions of enforcement.
The Village
For the purposes of this section, we imagine that there is no central government. We want to model the problem facing a village with a forest commons. If there are adequate means to monitor and enforce compliance with a collective agreement, then outcomes will be Pareto efficient. We discuss this problem under the heading of "Perfect Enforcement." On the other hand, it may be that deviations from a collective agreement cannot be punished at all; we discuss the solution to this problem under the heading of "No Enforcement." Finally, we can imagine a continuum of intermediate cases, in which the range of sanctions available to the collectivity of the village is enough to deter completely individualistic behavior, but not enough to achieve a Pareto efficient outcome: we formulate this problem under the heading of "Imperfect Enforcement." 2.1. Perfect Enforcement. We think of a village as a set of m identical households, situated in or near a common property forest consisting of F trees, which grows at some fixed rate δ. The number of trees in the forest is bounded below by zero. Each household is endowed with preferences over fuelwood and the forest stock. The single period utility of a household which consumes some nonnegative quantity of fuelwood w when the size of the forest is F is given by some function U (F, w).
We assume that U is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable, with Each household derives utility from fuelwood and the forest stock in every period over an infinite horizon. Households discount future utility using some discount factor β ∈ [0, 1). Accordingly, in the absence of any externalities, the value of the forest to a representative household may be recursively defined via Bellman's equation as
such that
where V (F ) denotes the value (in utils) of a forest stock F , and F ′ denotes tomorrow's level of forest stock (determined by the current stock, the quantity of fuelwood harvested today and the rate of growth of the forest). The forest stock can only increase through the natural regeneration of existing stock and not through investments in the forest stock in the form of tree-planting. We assume that households neither buy nor sell fuelwood. While this assumptions does not fit every situation, remote villages with relatively homogeneous populations are common in many developing countries.
A solution to this functional equation is some value function V : R → R which assigns value to the forest, and some policy function g : R → R which gives an optimal rule for the quantity to harvest given the current level of the forest stock, or w = g(F ).
Note that the representative household is effectively able to control the total quantity (mw) of the forest harvested by the entire village, guaranteeing an efficient outcome. One could say that the village was cooperating in the management of the common property forest.
No Enforcement.
Under the Pareto efficient solution, any particular household will typically benefit by harvesting more than its share of fuelwood. Thus, implementing a Pareto optimal outcome requires some sort of mechanism for enforcing any collective agreement. In this section, we model the game in which each household chooses its own level of fuelwood consumption, taking as given what other households do-that is, with no enforcement. 4 Formally, the problem facing the household in this setting is quite similar to that given above, except that each household takes as given the behavior of the other (m − 1) households. In particular, consider the problem facing the ith household. Suppose that each of the remaining (m − 1) households take from the forest some quantity of fuelwoodŵ, so that the problem facing the household is to solve
The solution to the household's problem is a pair of functions (V, g) where w = g(F,ŵ) gives the household's best response to a harvestŵ by each of the other households, given that the current level of the forest stock is F .
Since, in addition to others' behavior, strategies depend only on the current realization of the state variable, and because we assume that households have no means of precommitting to some particular sequence of harvests, the natural equilibrium concept in this setting is Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). This equilibrium notion has previously been applied to games involving a common resource by [11] , [8] , [18] , and [9] . In addition, we require strategies to be continuously differentiable functions of the state, and restrict our attention to symmetric strategies. Accordingly, a symmetric equilibrium is some particular function g(F,ŵ) such that (i) g(F,ŵ) solves the household's problem; and (ii) w = g(F, w). We simplify notation by writing the equilibrium strategy as some g(F ).
In general it seems difficult to establish the existence of an MPE in pure strategies and continuous state spaces, such as we have here, and we avoid the issue in this paper simply by assuming existence.
However, existence has been established in environments closely related to the one we consider here, and general results are available for special cases of the environment we consider. In particular, [7] establish existence in lower semi-continuous strategies in an environment very similar to our own. Their results are, unfortunately, not applicable to the case we consider because we require strategies to be continuously differentiable. In the special case of our problem in which preferences are specified to be linear-quadratic functions of the state and action, the game we discuss here becomes a linear-quadratic one. Existence in this class of games is assured under some standard regularity conditions [15] ; furthermore, there exists a unique MPE so long as the horizon is finite [14] . We exploit these latter results in the computed examples of this paper by specifying a linearquadratic structure [12] , and selecting an equilibrium to the infinite horizon game by taking the limit as the terminal period approaches infinity. 5 2.3. Imperfect Enforcement. The MPE of the game we have described often exhibits a dynamic version of a 'tragedy' of the commons. However, assuming that households completely fail to influence each others' behavior may be too pessimistic, because households may be capable of designing institutions or participating in markets which would ameliorate the 'commons externality' which they face. In this paper, we wish to consider the consequences of households overcoming the externality they face, either partially or completely. To this end we parameterize the enforcement technology available to the village, using some number ξ as an enforcement parameter which lies between zero (no enforcement) and one (perfect enforcement). For now, the enforcement parameter is taken as given by the village; we think of it as depending on the physical and social environment of the village. Villages that can observe fuelwood collection, have the authority to impose legal sanctions, or have strong leadership will have a high ξ. 6 Of course, many of the things affecting ξ may not be exogenous; this possibility is addressed in Section 5.
In order to capture this behavior, we rewrite the law of motion for the forest stock as
When ξ is equal to zero, we recover the 'tragic' problem; when ξ is equal to one, we recover the fully efficient problem. From this equation it seems clear that the individual household is, by cooperating with other households, in some sense able to control a larger portion of the forest harvest. Now let the welfare cost of limited enforcement be defined as the difference between the value of the forest stock given perfect enforcement and some enforcement parameterξ; ie, V (F ) ξ=1 -V (F ) ξ=ξ . Welfare cost is decreasing asξ approaches one, and measures the efficiency of the equilibrium relative to the Pareto optimal allocation.
Effects of Government Policy
To this point we have not explicitly introduced the government to our model. In fact the government plays a key role in the evolution of the forest stock through logging operations. Later in the paper we will permit the government to make optimizing decisions; for now we simply ask how each of two possible government policies-the benchmark and Joint Forest Management-effects village and household behavior.
3.1. The Benchmark Policy: Random Government. Under the benchmark policy, the state holds title to all forest lands and grants villagers the right to harvest some stream of forest products.
The state, however, clearcuts the forest at random intervals.
In every period villagers harvest some fuelwood knowing that there is some fixed non-negative probability (denoted by π) that the state will cut the forest in the next period. Thus, governmental behavior (from the villagers' perspective) is summarized by a single number, π.
For an infinite horizon the problem faced by the household can be written as the following dynamic program,
where V π (F ) is the discounted expected utility that each household receives from an initial forest stock F over the infinite horizon when there is a π probability in each period of the forests being cut by the state. V π (F ) has two components, utility received in the first period, U (F, w) and a stream of discounted benefits when the state allows the forest stock to grow β(1 − π)V π (F ′ ). Note that V π (0) = 0 by virtue of the law of motion and the fact that villagers cannot consume negative amounts of fuelwood.
This problem has precisely the same form as the problem in the earlier sections and therefore we can use the same methods to solve for the equilibrium policy function, g π (F ).
Common sense suggests that village welfare tends to decrease in the probability of harvest by the state. However, the result is not trivial because of strategic interaction between villagers.
Although the following proposition gives a set of sufficient conditions for the result to hold, it is possible to construct a perverse counterexample with, say, three villagers in which increases in π actually increases village welfare.
3.2. Joint Forest Management. A JFM contract specifies the date at which the forests adjoining the village will be harvested, and promises to the village a share of the proceeds from the harvest at that date.
The value to the villager of a JFM contract that extends over T periods is
subject to the usual law of motion for the forest stock, and where F 1 = F , and ρ is a constant denoting the share of the terminal harvest given to the village. Let g ρ,T (F, t) be the equilibrium strategy for this problem. If we assume that the forests cannot regenerate if there is no forest stock, or that J T (0) = 0 then equation (8) also defines the value of the initial forest stock over the infinite horizon.
We would like to understand how a change in the time horizon of JFM changes the value of JFM to the village. The villagers do not unambiguously prefer a larger T , since extending the length of the contract also postpones the date at which the villagers receive the terminal payoff from the government.
Let ϕ be a function that gives the preharvest forest stock for a given ρ, T , F 0 and ξ; that is, Proposition 2. Consider a JFM contract of length T , with preharvest stockF = ϕ(ρ, T |F 0 , ξ). If
Proposition 2 gives a sufficient condition (equation 9) for households to prefer a longer JFM contract. Note that this condition is satisfied for β sufficiently close to one. Intuitively, if villagers are sufficiently patient they prefer to wait for their share of the timber harvest and benefit from the growth of the forest rather than to receive a smaller quantity of timber sooner.
Also of interest is the time path of the forest stock as T varies. As long as the length of the contract is sufficiently long, and the initial stock is sufficiently low, then the forest stock will increase during the early years of the JFM contract, reach a temporary 'steady-state,' and then will decline somewhat to a "preharvest level" before the final timber harvest. Figure 1 illustrates this point; with T = 8, there is time for the forest to reach a 'steady state;' however, before the government harvest, the village acts in order to reduce the stock to its optimal preharvest level. Over shorter time periods, of course, there may not be time to reach the steady state (or indeed, the optimal preharvest) level of the stock.
Through its choice of ρ, the government has some control over the preharvest forest stock chosen by the villagers. The effect of ρ on preharvest forest stock determines whether government policy can reduce the welfare costs of limited enforcement. For example, if the preharvest level of the forest stock increases with an increase in ρ, then by offering a higher share the state will induce villages to reduce fuelwood extraction, even if enforcement is limited. This may well reduce the welfare cost of such limited enforcement.
The relationship between ρ and the preharvest level of forest stock depends on the villagers' elasticity of marginal utility of fuelwood which we denote by α, where α = − U 22 U 2 w. 7 An increase in the harvest share offered to villagers leads to two countervailing effects. On the one hand the increase in share reduces the villagers' incentives to run down the stock prior to harvest; on the other hand consumption smoothing induces the villagers to increase harvest today. Which of these effects dominates depends on the curvature of the utility function and thus on α. When fuelwood and the forest stock are not strong complements, then when α is less than one, the preharvest stock will increase, and when greater than one will decrease as ρ approaches one (see Lemma 3 in appendix for details).
This result seems quite important. Contrary to what one might suppose, the state cannot necessarily induce conservation of the forest by increasing the villager's share of the harvest. Typical estimates of α in Indian villages are larger than one [3] ; consequently, we would expect large village shares to have the perverse effect of increasing exploitation.
Turning attention from the share ρ to the enforcement parameter ξ, Lemma 3 also shows that the preharvest stock is an increasing function of the ability of the village to enforce the efficient outcome. Villages with a poor enforcement technology will typically run down the preharvest level of forest stock more than villages with a better enforcement technology.
3.3.
Comparing JFM to the Benchmark Policy. We now turn to a comparison of JFM and the benchmark policy for the villagers. Holding the enforcement technology fixed we define village preferences over the two policies in a parameter space where the length of the contract and the probability of harvest by the state vary. Next we vary the ability of villagers to enforce the efficient outcome and ask how preferences over the two policies change with a change in ξ.
Suppose that we fix the initial level of the forest stock at some number F and the share of the timber given to village at some number ρ. We can now imagine tracing out the locus of points (π, T ) The locus is illustrated in Figure 2 . Proposition 3 gives sufficient conditions for the locus to (i) exist; (ii) be downward sloping; and (iii) asymptote to zero as T gets large. We have already established that the value of the forest stock increases with a decrease in the probability of harvest (Proposition 1). Also, the welfare of a sufficiently patient village increases with an increase in the length of the JFM contract (Proposition 2). Hence, if villagers are to be indifferent between the benchmark policy and JFM, a decrease in π must be compensated for by an increase in the length of the JFM contract. This makes the locus downward sloping.
The villagers prefer JFM for any (π, T ) pair which occurs to the right of the locus and the benchmark policy for any pair which occurs to the left. This in turn implies that from the villagers' point of view, neither policy dominates the other. Villagers prefer a benchmark policy with a low probability of harvest to a short JFM contract. When the probability of harvest is high and JFM contracts are longer JFM is preferred to the benchmark.
Whether or not a village which is less able to enforce a collective agreement is more apt to prefer JFM depends on the relative position of the loci, which in turn may depend on the enforcement parameter ξ. A rightward shift of the locus implies a preference for the benchmark while a leftward shift a preference for JFM.
The following proposition helps us to compare villagers' preferences over the two policies across villages with different enforcement abilities by telling how the locus will shift in response to a decrease in ξ.
Let J T (F ) ξ=1 − J T (F ) ξ=ξ be the welfare cost of a length T JFM contract for a village with an enforcement parameter ofξ and let V π (F ) ξ=1 − V π (F ) ξ=ξ be the the welfare cost for the same enforcement technology under the benchmark policy when there is a π probability that the state will harvest in the next period.
Proposition 4. Fix some T > 0. There exists a unique pair (π,π) such that 
The State
Up to this point we have not considered the problem facing the government. We analyze the government's problem in this section, under the assumption that the government will choose whether to apply JFM or to use the benchmark policy in order to maximize its expected discounted revenues from timber. Under either regime, the government is fully cognizant of the effects that changes in policy will have upon the equilibrium strategies of the villages, and chooses optimally given this knowledge. While this has something of the flavor of a game between the state and the village, note that the village's behavior isn't necessarily a best response to the government's strategy, since the village's collective strategy is itself the Markov perfect equilibria of a common resource game played among the households of the village. 8 If the government chooses to implement JFM it has to then choose the village's share ρ and the length of the contract T ; the pair (ρ, T ) completely specifies a JFM contract. Alternatively, if it chooses to implement the benchmark policy, then it must choose the probability of harvest, which is completely determined by the single probability π. In making this decision, the government will, in general, take into account the circumstances of the village it proposes to contract with. In this very stylized model, villages vary only according to the initial level of forest stock, F 0 ; and the enforcement parameter ξ.
We first consider benchmark policy; the government chooses to harvest timber with some probability π. Let
denote the equation of motion for forest stock as a function of the probability of government harvest, π, the time since last harvest (or the initiation of the harvesting policy), t, and the initial forest stock F 0 . This function depends on the rate of growth of the forest of course, but more importantly depends on the behavior of the villagers, given the government's policy.
We require the government to choose some π once and for all. 9 To formulate the government's problem, we assume that the government chooses π optimally. In this case, we can write an equation expressing the surplus for the government as a function of the probability of harvest. Call this function S(F 0 , π); it is given by
which can be rearranged to give
In our computed example, villagers increase harvest with both a decrease in the enforcement parameter (ξ) and an increase in the probability of harvest (π). By reducing π the government can reduce the amount the villagers harvest as ξ decreases, thus changing the magnitude of the externality. The probability of harvest increases as the initial level of the forest stock increases.
These are illustrated in Figure 3 .
We next consider JFM, the alternative policy measure available to the government. The problem facing the government then is to choose T and ρ to maximize its discounted expected timber 
The function ϕ(ρ, T |F 0 , ξ) gives the forest stock at T under a JFM contract (ρ, T ), given an initial forest stock F 0 , and with an enforcement technology indexed by ξ.
The first subplot of Figure 4 gives the government's optimal choice of contract length, given some initial forest stock F 0 and some village level enforcement parameter ξ. It is clear from this picture that the choice of contract length may be a fairly blunt instrument, at least so long as T is required to be an integer. In our model, the government chooses a contract length of one for high levels of ξ and initial forest stock and a contract length of two for low levels. This allows the forest The sharp shift in optimal contract length is mirrored by a sharp change in the share offered to different villages; this is shown in the second subplot of Figure 4 . At high levels of ξ the state does not have to part with a share of the timber harvest in order to discourage the villagers from running down the stock prior to harvest. Ability to enforce the optimal outcome provides a sufficient buffer against over-exploitation. However, as villagers' ability to enforce decreases the state has to increase the share of harvest granted to the villagers to prevent sharp declines in the forest stock prior to harvest. This is all for a contract of one period. For a sufficiently low level of ξ the state finds it advantageous to increase the length of the contract rather than increase harvest share. In fact, at the same values of initial forest stock and ξ which lead to an increase in the length T of the contract, the government finds it advantageous to sharply reduce the share of the final harvest offered to the village.
The combination of the shift in the optimal contract length and optimal share actually smoothes out the government's surplus from forest harvest under JFM, as shown in part of the first subplot of Figure 5 . This surplus is, of course, increasing in the level of the initial forest stock. It may be less obvious that the government's value is decreasing as the villagers' ability to enforce, ξ, grows small. However, this follows from the fact that poor enforcement leads to higher rates of harvest by the villagers. Furthermore, the state has to part with a greater share of the timber harvest when the households are not cooperating to reduce the incentive to over-harvest.
We are now in a position to compare the value of the benchmark policy and JFM to the state.
As the first subplot of Figure 5 illustrates, the government is better off choosing the benchmark policy rather than JFM for all levels of values of initial forest stock and ξ. This happens because while JFM provides secure access to forest products, this very security generates its own set of perverse incentives. In particular, by replacing an uncertain harvest date with a certain one, JFM induces villagers to run down the forest stock in advance of the harvest date. This result depends on the elasticity of villagers' marginal utility of consumption. In fact if the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption is greater than one then JFM may be preferred to the benchmark. As discussed in Section 3.2 if the elasticity of villagers' marginal utility of consumption is greater than one then terminal harvest can be increased through a decrease in the share of the harvest given to the village. Government revenue increases because both the harvest and the government's share increases.
Though we have already examined the village response to particular JFM contracts above, it may be interesting to think about village response to the particular values of (ρ, T ) which are optimal from the government's point of view, given the exogenous variables ξ and F 0 . For our computed example, given the optimal policy choice by the state, the villagers are better off under the benchmark policy rather than JFM. This is illustrated in the second subplot of Figure 5 .
Endogenous Enforcement
We've shown that, given the enforcement technology available, JFM need not lead to better outcomes than the benchmark policy, either in terms of villagers' welfare, the government timber harvest, or in terms of deforestation. However, proponents of JFM sometimes talk about the role that JFM plays in inducing villagers to develop local institutions to aid in enforcement. If JFM rewards institution building, then perhaps we should regard the enforcement parameter ξ as an endogenous variable, and ask whether or not JFM provides incentives for villagers to a higher level of ξ.
We think of a village being able to choose a higher level of ξ by doing things like hiring forest guards, promoting fuelwood conservation, choosing community leaders to be responsible for forest management, or engaging in any of a myriad of things which might help to produce a more efficient collective outcome. If this kind of institution-building were costless, then all villages would have a wealth of effective institutions-there must be some cost associated with investing in institutions and a higher ξ. These costs may be very difficult to quantify, and we will not attempt to do so; all we assume is that the costs of investing in ξ are independent of whether the government implements JFM or the benchmark policy.
Let the costs of investments in better enforcement be some function C(ξ, F ). Note that costs of developing enforcement institutions may depend on the initial level of forest stock in the village commons. We assume that these costs are non-negative, increasing and weakly convex in ξ. We have already characterized the benefits to the village of having a higher ξ; these are given by V ξ (F ) under the benchmark policy, and by J ξ (F ) under JFM. Now suppose the benchmark policy has been adopted by the state. At time zero, we imagine that a village with forest stock F collectively chooses some level of enforcement, solving the problem
Any interior solution ξ * will satisfy ∂V ξ * (F )/∂ξ = C ′ (ξ * ). Similarly, if the state has implemented JFM, any interior solution to the village's problem of choosing a level of enforcement will satisfy
. Because the cost function C(·) is independent of the government's choice of policy, the ordering of the village's choice of ξ depends only on the marginal benefit functions.
Although we're unable to reach a general conclusion about the ordering of marginal benefits, in our computed solutions it invariably turns out that ∂V ξ (F )/∂ξ is larger than ∂J ξ (F )/∂ξ when ξ is small, but that this ordering actually reverses itself when ξ is large. Under the benchmark policy, when enforcement is particularly good the government is more likely to set π to a large number, and so by choosing a low level of enforcement the village can actually discourage government harvests. The ability of the village to effect government harvests is more limited under JFM, because the government's choice of T dominates the villagers' welfare comparison, and because this T isn't affected by marginal changes in ξ. Thus, JFM will be better at stimulating investments in enforcement technology when the marginal cost of enforcement technology are low, while the benchmark policy will be better when those marginal costs are high.
Conclusion
In this paper we've been concerned with the the interplay between centralized and decentralized management of local forest commons in a dynamic environment. We've paid particular attention to one type of central policy called JFM, because policies of this sort are often claimed to be a useful tool for the state to use in promoting good village-level management practices. We are interested in answering three questions: first, when do villagers prefer JFM to a very simple benchmark policy; second, if the state wants to maximize its expected timber revenues, which of the two policies should the state choose to implement in the villages; and third, which policy is more apt to stimulate the development of improved village-level enforcement?
We address the first question in section 3. If villagers are sufficiently patient, then for any JFM policy there exists a benchmark policy which makes the villagers at least as well off. The converse need not hold. Patient villagers will prefer longer JFM contracts, and prefer any benchmark policy under which the government harvests with a lower probability.
In section 4 we analyse the preferences of the state. We find the logic which drives the government to prefer the benchmark policy in our example economies compelling. Whenever villagers face a known terminal date, they will tend to respond by running down the stock in advance of that date.
The state's best response to this strategy profile is to harvest earlier, so as to give the villagers less time to reduce the stock. The equilibrium outcome has the state harvesting every one or two periods, when the forest stock is low enough that it's costly for the villagers to run it down even further. This result depends on the assumption about the elasticity of villagers' marginal utility of consumption and requires that the elasticity be less than one. In fact, if the elasticity is greater than one then it is possible that JFM maybe preferred to the benchmark. Proof. Suppose there exist (F,F ) such that F ′ =F ′ but F =F . The Euler equations evaluated at F and (1 − ξ) ). Since F ′ =F ′ by assumption, the Euler equations evaluated at
. After making this substitution, differentiate U 2 (F, g(F )) = U 2 (F , g(F )) with respect toF . So long as −U 22 (F, w) = mU 12 (F, w) we get a contradiction. Hence, F =F . Finally, since ψ(0) = 0 so long as firewood consumption is constrained to be non-negative, F ′ is also an increasing function of F . 
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let F ′ π = (1 + δ)(F − 2g π (F )). Then the law of motion for the forest stock implies that
. Equilibrium requires that each households' action be a best response, or,
and adding up this pair of incentive compatibility constraints implies that
Cauchy's Generalized Law of the Mean implies that
for some F such that Fπ < F < F π . Combining the last two equations yields
and taking the log of both sides and then dividing by (π − π) gives log(
π−π which in the limit is equal to − ∂ log(
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let {F * t } T +1
t=0 denote the optimal path of the forest stock under a JFM contract of length T , for some (ρ, F 0 ). Now consider a JFM contract of length T + 1:
where the first line is just the definition of J 1 T +1 , and the second line is the value of following the optimal path from the T contract for the first T periods, and then keeping the forest stock at the terminal level for an extra period. Since this is feasible by construction, the inequality follows.
Thus, a sufficient condition for villagers to prefer a longer contract is that the second line be greater .
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. First observe that J ∞ (F ) = V 0 (F ) = ∞ t=0 β t U (F t , g(F t )). Let g 1 (F ) be the equilibrium strategy under a benchmark policy with π = 1. Then V 1 (F ) = U (F, g 1 (F )) and J 1 (F ) ≥ U (F, g 1 (F )) + βU (F ′ , ρF ′ ). This implies that J 1 (F ) ≥ V 1 (F ). From proposition 3 we know that for a sufficiently large β, J T +1 ≥ J T . Proposition 1 establishes that V π (F ) is continuous and decreasing in π. The result follows from the fact that the range of V π (F ) includes [J 1 (F ), J ∞ (F )]. Proof of Proposition 4
Consider Figure 6 . The solid lines denote the value of the forest stock when ξ = 1 while the dotted lines indicate the value when ξ =ξ. Also, the upward sloping curves capture the value of the stock under JFM and the downward sloping curves the value under the benchmark. Consider a JFM contract of length T = 2. A p probability of harvest equates the value of the forest stock under JFM and benchmark when ξ = 1 while ap probability equates the value of the forest when ξ =ξ. The welfare cost of ξ =ξ under JFM with a contract of length T = 2 is (b − a) while the welfare cost under the benchmark with a p probability of harvest is (c − d). Clearly whenever the latter dominates the formerp will be less than p.
